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Though the English-speaking world produced some important works in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century (note, e.g., John Stuart Mill, William Whewell, and C. S. Peirce),
modern history and philosophy of science were born in continental Europe, in countries
such as France, Germany, and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and later in Austria. The
reviewed work, European Philosophy of Science—Philosophy of Science in Europe and
the Viennese Heritage, edited by Maria Carla Galavotti, Elisabeth Nemeth, and Friedrich
Stadler, which is Volume 17 of the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, is just about
European philosophy of science.
Two themes dominate the volume: (1) the aforementioned European philosophy of
science and (2) the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the Vienna Circle Institute.
The Vienna Circle Institute plays an important role also in the context of (1). After most
members of the Vienna Circle emigrated from Austria, only Victor Kraft and Be´la Juhos
stayed in Vienna to continue the earlier researches done by Schlick, Carnap, and others.
Actually during the late 1940s, there was an attempt by Arthur Pap, Paul Feyerabend,
Herbert Feigl, Elisabeth Anscombe and others to revive the spirit of the Circle (this is
called the ‘‘Third Vienna Circle’’), but their efforts were unsuccessful. Later, Wolfgang
Stegmu¨ller made important contributions according to the earlier Viennese lines.
Nonetheless, European, especially Austrian history and philosophy of science were always
quite special, both in its context and its scope.
The Vienna Circle Institute (founded by Friedrich Stadler in 1991) aims to promote,
uphold, investigate, and revive the works done by logical empiricists and their associates in
the twentieth century, especially by the Vienna Circle. Thanks to the efforts of Stadler and
many prominent scholars linked to the Institute from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the
renewed interested (going back at least to Rudolf Haller in the 1980s) in logical empiricism
developed into a detailed and sharp research program and/or paradigm. Though much work
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was done already, there is still much to do—especially in the archives and regarding the
general historical episodes about successes and failures in the past.
The present volume is a neat contribution to these issues. It contains 20 chapters based
on papers presented at the 2011 conference in Vienna under the same title, with the support
of the European Science Foundation. The first chapter is Friedrich Stadler’s detailed
summary of the last twenty years of the Institute’s public work. Though Stadler might be a
bit too laconic for someone without the required background knowledge about the many
logical empiricists, it is a quite comprehensive material about the fascinating work that was
done in Vienna. It might also be important for anyone working in logical empiricism, as a
reference point about where to look for materials produced in the last twenty years.
The other chapters could be divided into three general categories: (1) works about
logical empiricism, (2) works in the context of and related to European philosophy, and (3)
general philosophy of science articles. They are devoted to such issues as history and/or
philosophy of science (Cristina Chimisso about Bachelard and philosophy of chemistry,
Claude Debru about dreams, and the scientific controversies and issues around sleep
studies); probabilities and related notions (Maria Carla Galavotti about probabilistic
epistemology, Michael Esfeld about epistemological and ontological reduction, Wlodek
Rabinowicz and Lina Eriksson about betting interpretation and the notion of degrees of
belief, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson about probabilities of probabilities and
regress); mathematics (Ladislav Kvasz about mathematical knowledge based on experi-
ence, Pablo Lorenzano about mathematical models and tools in biology); Philosophy of
Science in Poland (Jan Wolen´ski about Kazimierz Twardowski); Physical Sciences (John
D. Norton about infinite idealizations in statistical physics); Social Sciences (Herlinde
Pauer-Studer about Hans Kelsen’s legal positivism), whereas Jan Faye considers the
prospect of unity of science, with special attention to the logical empiricist version.
Six chapters are devoted to the history and philosophy of logical empiricism. Thomas
Uebel considers Carnap’s Aufbau and the question of physicalism. Though he already took
into account Carnap’s major work in his earlier works on Neurath, now he goes deeper
about the thesis that the psychological concepts and physical concepts are ‘‘mutually
reducible’’ to each other in the Aufbau. Uebel distinguishes a strong and a weak version of
what he calls the ‘‘intertranslatability thesis’’ (p. 46), discusses their places in the Aufbau,
and argues that Carnap took the reduction of the autopsychological to the physical to be
problematic already in the Aufbau, and hence concludes that ‘‘it is not the case that […]
Carnap could have been even only a quasi-physicalist if he had wanted to’’ (p. 55). (It
should be noted that Uebel continued his investigations into Carnap, physicalism and the
Aufbau in Christian Dambo¨ck’s (ed.) Influences on the Aufbau, Springer, 2016, pp. 51–75).
The second chapter concerning logical empiricism is by Richard Creath about Carnap’s
early arguments against metaphysics and their contemporary relevance. Creath’s short
piece is not a typical academic paper, sounding rather like a manifesto, or a short situation
report. Nonetheless, it has a rightful place in the volume. Creath produced some clarifying
remarks about the scope and context of Carnap’s metaphysics critique (mainly from his
Pseudoproblems in Philosophy) and discussed those presuppositions (like the structure of
the Aufbau, the nature of evidence, the patterns of scientific inference, and the extent of our
knowledge) that are usually ignored and thus cause some misunderstanding. The most
important part of the chapter is, however, where Creath claims that ‘‘we still have a
superfluity of horoscope readers, religious and ethnic bigots, evolution and climate change
deniers, radio talk show hosts, and, in the USA, candidates for high public office’’ (p. 74).
It would be important to see the various parallels between the late 1920s/early 1930s and
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our contemporary situation. (Many fear a similar right-wing political development, with
some dogmatically religious underpinnings.)
Gu¨nther Sandner’s chapter about Otto Neurath is based on hitherto unknown archival
materials. Its subject is Neurath’s early development as a socially and politically engaged
student, citizen, and scholar. Sandner explores those figures that had a decisive effect on
Neurath’s thinking, especially on the relation of science and politics. Though the chap-
ter touches upon important questions (such as the meaning of ‘‘Marxism,’’ ‘‘politics,’’
‘‘apolitical,’’ ‘‘social and political engagement’’ in the original context of Neurath’s time),
the whole seems to be a bit of a research summary. Hence, one is tempted to say, the reader
is eager to read also in English Sandner’s outstanding political bibliography of Neurath
(published already in German).
Two chapters are devoted to logical empiricists’ philosophy of science. Firstly, Tho-
masz Placek gives a succinct analysis of the notion of (in)determinism used in the Vienna
Circle. He focuses on Schlick and especially on the mature Philipp Frank and shows their
various approaches to handle the supposedly ‘‘tautological’’ character of the thesis of
(in)determinism. The most laconic but promising part of his chapter is where he tries to
make explicit the possible historical lines (or the lack of them) from the Vienna Circle to
the second half of the twentieth century (Arthur Prior, Saul Kripke, and others).
The other chapter, written by Matthias Neuber, is aimed to show that ‘‘it has been
largely ignored by the historians of logical empiricism that there indeed existed a realist
faction within the logical empiricist movement’’ (p. 249, emphasis in the original). Neuber
dismisses the ideas of Reichenbach and Feigl, since even though they are considered to be
scientific realists (contrary to Carnap), their ‘‘realism is dependent on the pragmatic
dimension of adopting certain language forms (or linguistic frameworks)’’ (p. 259).
Though Neuber does not say that explicitly in the chapter, in the mentioned sense Carnap
could be viewed also as a realist. What Neuber is looking for is a sense of realism that aims
for a language- and mind-independent reality in the fullest sense of ontology. His con-
clusion is that Eino Kaila maintained the closest view to such realism—unfortunately, the
chapter ends where it could bring in new perspectives into the debates, and the reader is
referred to other papers of the author.
The last chapter to be mentioned about logical empiricism is Eckehart Ko¨hler’s piece on
Carnap’s and Go¨del’s philosophy of mathematics. The chapter is not just much longer than
the aforementioned ones, but touches on so many problems and notions that it makes it
quite hard to follow at once. Nevertheless, it is an outstanding work on Carnap and his
philosophical oeuvre from his Syntax to his last papers, contrasted with Go¨del’s recently
published remarks about Carnap’s Syntax program. Ko¨hler discusses conventions, syntax,
semantics, decisions, and intuitions—one of the most important features of his chapter is
the discussion of Carnap’s late acceptance of intuitions as important tools in scientific
activity. However, unfortunately in the Go¨del parts of the article Ko¨hler did not compare
his views with that of Andre´ Carus and Stewe Awodey, who published important papers on
Go¨del’s critique of Carnap.
Finally, referring back to the title of the collection and the introduction of the present
review, Gereon Wolters brings the idea of European philosophy of science to the fore-
ground and he is not optimistic. He describes the situations in a way that shows that
European philosophy of science is ruled by Anglophone dominance. The non-native
English speakers are in quite an unfavorable situation for various reasons (pp. 277–289)—
this affects not just their own careers in Europe both also in their own country (where the
most important standard seems to be visibility in the Anglophone circles), but it has a
devastating impact on European philosophy of science too. At the end of his chapter (pp.
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289–291), Wolters offers six possible paths, tools, and advices to improve the chances of a
genuine European philosophy of science; unfortunately, his ideas aims to bring equality to
the field by making non-native English speakers better English speakers and not the other
way around, or otherwise.
The reviewer would like to call attention to two chapters from the ‘‘General Part’’ of the
volume (which also contains the written version of the ‘‘18th Vienna Circle Lecture’’ held
by Dagfinn Føllesdal about ‘‘Husserl and Go¨del on Mathematical Objects and our Access
to them’’). The first one is Veronika Hofer and Michael Sto¨ltzner’s ‘‘Vienna Circle His-
toriographies,’’ in which they summarize and, more importantly, catalog both the logical
empiricists’ self-historiographies and the later philosophical and historical works done on
logical empiricism, usually connected to the Vienna Circle Institute. The other chapter is
Massimo Ferrari’s review essay on recent works on Moritz Schlick. He summarizes and
evaluates Volume 2 of Schlick-Studien and Volumes 3 and 5 of Schlickiana. Both of them
are more than interesting and important for anyone interested in the general lines of recent
work on logical empiricism.
Summing up, the 17th volume of the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook contains many
insightful chapters, which might be rightfully taken as reference points for further research
for anyone working inside and/or outside the European philosophy of science scene.
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